Following the terrorist attack in central London on 3 rd June 2017, the Prime Minister declared, 'Enough is enough' in relation to violent extremism. Just 15 days later, however, the flag of the proscribed terrorist group, Hizballah, was paraded through central London without police intervention. This is because of a loophole by which UK legislation proscribes only Hizballah's military 'wing', but not its supposed political 'wing'. This article examines the legal background to this situation and argues that the current distinction between Hizballah's supposed 'wings' is untenable. If the Home Secretary shares the Prime Minister's view that 'Enough is enough', she should now move to proscribe Hizballah in its entirety.
Introduction
On 3 rd June 2017, a terrorist attack at London Bridge killed eight and left 48 injured.
The following day, Theresa May said that there had been 'far too much tolerance of extremism' in the UK and stated, 'Enough is enough' (Walker, 2017) . Just two weeks later, however, at the annual Al-Quds Day March, the flags of the terrorist group Hizballah 1 were paraded through central London without police intervention (Harpin, 2017) . This article examines the background to this situation and argues for an urgent change in the law.
Introducing Hizballah
Hizballah, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia group, was established in the early 1980s, with the primary aim of driving foreign forces out of Lebanon (BBC, 2016a) . Its bombing of French and American bases in Beirut in 1983 claimed 299 lives (Levitt, 2013) . It is best known for its hostility towards Israel, culminating in the ruinous 2006 war (BBC, 2008a) . More recently, Hizballah has supported President Assad in Syria's civil war (Chulov, 2013 ).
Hizballah's use of the straight-armed salute requires little commentary (StrategyPage, 2014) . Nor does its distinctive militaristic emblem, which features a machine gun brandished aloft (Crone and Boyle, 2015) . Nor do these ominous 2002 words of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah:
But I'll tell you. Among the signs […] and signals which guide us, in the Islamic prophecies and not only in the Jewish prophecies, is that this State [of Israel] will be established, and that the Jews will gather from all parts of the world into occupied Palestine, not in order to bring about the anti-Christ and the end of the world, but rather that Allah the Glorified and Most High wants to save you from having to go to the ends of the world, for they have gathered in one place -they have gathered in one place -and there the final and decisive battle will take place. (cited in Rosenberg, 2015, emphasis added) Nasrallah's words have not prevented Hizballah from actively 'going to the ends of the world'. In the words of Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute, Hizballah has established a 'global footprint' of terrorist and criminal activity (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2013), with a particular focus on Europe (Levitt, 2015a) . Importantly, however, Hizballah has also participated in parliamentary elections in Lebanon since 1992 and won 10 seats in the most recent (2009) elections (BBC, 2016a) . It holds positions within the current government (BBC, 2016b) and also provides social welfare within Lebanon (Cammett, 2014) . As we shall see, therefore, Hizballah is not completely 'proscribed' under current UK law.
'Proscription' and its consequences: the legislation
Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 ('the Act'), 'terrorism' has a three-part definition. It comprises of the 'use or threat of action' involving (among other things) 'serious violence', 'for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause' and which is 'designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation'. Section 1(4)(a) and (d) provide that this definition can apply to action which is carried out outside the UK and/or which is designed to influence the government of countries other than the UK. It is not necessary to prove intention on the part of such a person to arouse the said suspicion.
Section 13(3) provides that a person guilty of this offence is liable to either a prison sentence of up to six months, or a fine, or both.
Under section 121 of the Act, an 'article' includes 'substance and any other thing'. This is clearly broad enough to include a flag or banner. The same section defines 'public place' as 'a place to which members of the public have or are permitted to have access'
-which plainly includes the streets of London.
Proscription and its consequences: the precedent
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been only one reported conviction under section 13 
Application to Hizballah
On a plain reading of the above provisions, it would clearly be appropriate to proscribe
Hizballah, as at least some of its activities fall within the definition of 'terrorism'.
Equally, and particularly following the case of Rankin v Murray, it would seem to be illegal to display the Hizballah flag on the streets of London. If wearing a ring displaying the initials 'UVF' was at the 'least serious end of the spectrum of conduct against which s. 13 strikes', carrying the Hizballah flag through the streets of London might appear to be at the other end. The latter is not a criminal offence, however, because UK legislation does not completely proscribe Hizballah, but currently distinguishes between its supposed 'military' and 'political' wings. We now turn to this distinction. 
Hizballah's 'wings' -the current distinction and its rationale

The consequences of the distinction
The consequences of this distinction were clearly seen on 18 Federation, 2017a) and to other items (Whatsupic, 2017 ). Yet they also chanted, 'From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free' -which is generally understood to be a call for the military destruction of the state of Israel (Zionist Federation, 2017b) . This would appear both to undermine any claim that they were supporting Hizballah's political 'wing' only and, in the words of section 13, to 'arouse reasonable suspicion' that they were also (or instead) supporting the proscribed military 'wing'.
Figure 1
Example of the stickers used to express support for the political wing of Hizballah
Arguments against the distinction
Arguments for maintaining the distinction between the supposed 'wings' are not persuasive. There is no consistent international approach: whilst some countries (and the EU) ban only Hizballah's political 'wing', it is banned entirely in others, including the USA (Levitt, 2015b, p. 10 Hizballah to disarm and wholly embrace democratic politics, this has clearly failed:
Hizballah has been actively involved in Syria's civil war (Chulov, 2013) and is reportedly preparing for a fresh conflict with Israel (May, 2017) .
Moreover, there is no reason in the Act itself why the supposed political 'wing' could not be proscribed. Under section 3(4) and (5) Levitt, 2015b, p. 13) .
In 2000 
Time to abolish the distinction
We end where we began. It is unconscionable that just 15 days after the central 3 Note that sections 4 to 6 of the Act create a procedure for any party to apply to be deproscribed, if it feels it has been proscribed wrongfully.
